Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1992

Society of Separationists v. Ron Whitehead, Tom
Godfrey, Nancy Pace, Alan Hardman, Roselyn Kirk
and Don Hale : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Roger F. Cutler; Salt Lake City Attorney; Bruce Baird; Assistant City Attorney; Attorneys for
Appellants.
Brian M. Barnard; John Pace; Joro Walker; Attorneys for Appellees; Kathryn D. Kendell; Paul T.
Morris: I. Robert Wall: Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Society of Separationists v. Ron Whitehead, Tom Godfrey, Nancy Pace, Alan Hardman, Roselyn Kirk and Don Hale, No.
920233.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4200

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

"NT

CKET no.

$2 023}

IN

'

'jkP

OF THE STATE -,r

TAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC., a Maryland non-profit
corprration; RICHARD ANDREWS
and J WALKER,
Case No
vs .

9 202 33

Category 16

.—< ••-ITEHEAD, POM GODFREY,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMANf
ROSELYN KIRK and DON HALE,
Members Salt Lake Council,

/ilNXO

Appeal from a Summary ^ ^ .-.
the Third District Court for c^s
Honorable

L3PI r- ; . i ARNARD
; HN PACE
.: . 4 E a s t Fil i.. v - - wi.
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111-3204
Te 1 eph<-. n e :
' '~
' 7 c - * " ~r ;
A11orney

f oi

Appe11ees

Attorneys iui Utah ..^ajue
of Cities & Towhf, et. a l ^
(Numerous Utah Cities?,^ f^ » W
Amicus Curiae

PAUL T. M O K K I ^
I. ROBERT WALL
3600 Constitution ^
West Valley City, Ut : *xx.,
Telephone: (801) 963- V?^l

rvbV : ; u i992

y

..«-.*•—

*:i Appeiian4. s

iL i. CHURCH
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephones -w01 , 896-b--312

Attorney for American Civil
Liberties Uni? * p~undation
of Utah, Inc.
Amicus Curiae

Att

ROGER F. CUTLER, #0/^1
Salt Lake City Attorney
BRUCE ;> . BAIRD, » 0 3 " •?
Assistant City Attorney
451 South State, Suite 505
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34 111
Telephone r • ' - •r - * '"At-*- --rr^yt

KATHRYN D. KENDELL
Boston Building #419
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
" * "3-8206

Ami

i» e u >unt y r

~- *nni - r r e c l e r 1 ck

CLERK sUPHtME COURT,
UTAH

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC., a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS;
and J. WALKER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Case No. 920233
vs.
Category 16
RON WHITEHEAD, TOM GODFREY,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN,
ROSELYN KIRK and DON HALE,
Members Salt Lake Council,
Defendants-Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by
the Third District Court for Salt Lake County,
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding.
BRIAN M. BARNARD
JOHN PACE
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531
Attorney for Appellees
KATHRYN D. KENDELL
Boston Building #419
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-8206
Attorney for American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation
of Utah, Inc.
Amicus Curiae
PAUL T. MORRIS
I. ROBERT WALL
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Telephone: (801) 963-3271
Attorneys for West Valley City
Amicus Curiae

ROGER F. CUTLER, #0791
Salt Lake City Attorney
BRUCE R. BAIRD, #0176
Assistant City Attorney
451 South State, Suite 505
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 535-7788
Attorneys for Appellants
PAUL D. LYMAN
DAVID L. CHURCH
250 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (801) 896-6812
Attorneys for Utah League
of Cities & Towns, e_t al.
(Numerous Utah Cities)
Amicus Curiae

Table of Contents
Page
RESPONSE TO THE SEPARATIONISTS'
STATEMENT REGARDING ISSUES IN THIS CASE

1

RESPONSE TO THE SEPARATIONISTS'
STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

3

POINT I
THE ACLU'S CONTENTION THAT THE LEGISLATIVE
ACTIONS OF THE CITY COUNCIL ARE NOT ACCORDED
ANY JUDICIAL PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY OR
DEFERENCE IS WRONG; IT MANIFESTS A BASIC
MISUNDERSTANDING OF A MUNICIPAL COUNCIL'S
RELATIONSHIP TO THE COURTS

3

POINT II
THE LOWER COURT JUDGMENT AND ORDER,
DIRECTED AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COUNCIL MEMBERS,
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
POINT III
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION REQUIRE A MULTI-FACETED
ANALYSIS AND NOT THE APPLICATION OF STATUTORY
"PLAIN MEANING" STANDARD

11

POINT IV
THE SCHOOL GRADUATION PRAYER AND FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE CASES CITED BY THE SEPARATIONISTS
AND THE ACLU ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THIS COURT'S
ANALYSIS HERE

19

POINT V
MARSH IS NOT A "NARROW EXEMPTION" BUT INSTEAD
A FULLY APPLICABLE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION
WHICH SUPPORTS THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION

30

POINT VI
THE ACLU'S PSEUDO-LEMON ANALYSIS IS INCORRECT

i

34

A.
B.

C.

THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION SERVES LEGITIMATE
AND EXPRESSED SECULAR PURPOSES

35

THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION DOES NOT HAVE THE
PRINCIPAL OR PRIMARY EFFECT OF ADVANCING OR
INHIBITING RELIGION

37

THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION DOES NOT CREATE AN
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT

40

CONCLUSION

44

ii

Table of Authorities
Cases
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 475 F.2d
29 (10th Cir. 1973)

39

Beitelspacher v. Risch, 105 Idaho 65, 671 P.2d
1068 (1983)

6

Brummitt v. Ogden Water Works Co., 33 Utah 285, 93 P.
828 (Utah 1908)

18

California Teachers Association v. Riles,
632 P.2d 953 (Cal. 1981)

20

Cooper v. Utah Light and Ry. Co., 35 Utah 570,
102 P. 202 (1909)

19

County of San Mateo v. Del J., 46 Cal.3d 1236,
762 P.2d 1202

21

Farrell v. Board of Trustees, 85 Cal. 408, 24 P.
868 (1890)

21

Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978)

....

21

Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement,
113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580 (1948)

30

Hanson v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980)

28

Kay v. David Douglas School District No. 40,
719 P.2d 875 (Ore.App. 1986)
Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d
451 (Utah 1985)
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed.2d
745, reh'g den'd 404 U.S. 876 (1971)
Lee v. Weisman. 505 U.S.

27
11

. . 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41

, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) . 22, 30, 31

Lynch v. Donnelly. 525 F.Supp. 1150 (D.R.I. 1981)
Lynch v. Donnelly. 465 U.S. 680 (1984)
Manning v. Sevier County. 30 Utah 2d 305, 517 P.2d
549 (Utah 1983)
iii

43
36-39, 41, 42
30

Marsa v. Wernik, 86 N.J. 232, 430 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1980),
cert, den'd, 454 U.S. 958, 70 L.Ed.2d 373 (1981) . . 20, 33, 35
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 77 L.Ed.2d
1019 (1983)

20, 22, 30-33, 39

Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978)

6

Mecham v. Gordon, 156 Ariz. 297, 751 P.2d
957 (1988)
Mitchell v. Consolidated School District No. 201, 135
P.2d 79 (Wash. 1943)
Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674,
59 P.2d 144 (1936)

21

Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal.App.3d 566
(Cal.Ct.App. 1989)

21

6
27

People ex rel. O'Meara v. City Council of Salt Lake
City, 23 Utah 13, 64 P. 460 (Utah 1900)
Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378 (1970)
Re Initiative Petition No. 281, State Question No. 441
v. Rogers, 434 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1967)
Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975),
cert, den. , 425 U.S. 915 (1976)
Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, 809 P.2d 809
(Cal. 1991)
State v. Bobo, 803 P. 2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990)
State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986)
State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980)
State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vermont 1985)
Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114
Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948)

17
...

15
15
5, 6

20-22
16
15
7
16, 17
30

Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District No. 506,
207 P.2d 198 (Wash. 1949)
Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d 973 (Wash. 1973)
Witters v. State Commission for the Blind,
771 P.2d 1119 (Wash. 1989)
iv

27
26, 27
26

Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 88 L.Ed.2d 846 (1986)
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1953)

25, 26
....

38

Statutes and Constitutions
31 U.S.C. S5112(d)(l)

39

36 U.S.C. §169h

38

36 U.S.C. §186

39

Section 10-3-506 Utah Code Annotated, 1953

6

Section 10-3-717 Utah Code Annotated, 1953

6

Section 10-3-718 Utah Code Annotated, 1953

6

Section 10-6-118 Utah Code Annotated, 1953

6

Constitution of the United States, First Amendment

. . . passim

Article I, Section 4 Utah Constitution

44

Article I, Section 15 Utah Constitution

14

Article VI, Section 28 Utah Constitution

7

Article VII, Section 8 Utah Constitution

7

Article XXII, Section 3 Utah Constitution

7

Article IX, Section 8 California Constitution

21

Article I, Section 11 Washington Constitution

23, 27

Article I, Section 5 Oregon Constitution

28

Article I, Section 2 Oregon Constitution

28

Texts
W. Murphy, J. Fleming and W. Harris, American
Constitutional Interpretation, 289 (The Foundation
Press, 1986)

v

13

Brad C. Smith, "Be No More Children": An Analysis of
Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, 1992
Utah L.Rev.

15, 29

Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the
Establishment Clauses in the Washington State
Constitution, 15 Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly, 451 (1988)

22, 23

Clor, Constitutional Interpretation and Regimen
Disciplines in The Constitution, the Courts and the
Quest for Justice, 115 (Goldwin and Schambra Eds. 1989) . . .

13

McDowell, Interpreting the Constitution in The Constitution,
the Courts, and the Quest for Justice, 17 (Goldwin and
Schambra Eds. 1989)

13

Perry, Interpreting the Constitution in The Constitution,
the Courts, and the Quest for Justice, 70
(Goldwin and Schambra Eds. 1989)

13

Reynolds, Local Government Law, 182-183 (West
Publishing Co. 1982)

6

5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §19.05 at p. 508
(3rd Ed.Rev.)

5, 6

Tribe and Dorf, On Reading the Constitution, 71 (1991)

...

13

Notes on a Bill of Rights, 1969 Utah L.Rev. 326

29

Stewart, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation, 17
Journal of Contemporary Law, 91 (1991)
R. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict, 10(1991)

12
13

Rules
Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Administration

2, 3

Rule 4-502(3), Code of Judicial Administration

8

Rule 24(e), Utah R.App.P

3

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

• • . .

vi

2, 3

TN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

„; Maryland non-profi
corporation; RIC HA.R f. - ^J 0"3 F% * ••

REPLY BRIEF

: .dint.. ^-Appellees,
Caso Nn

9 20 2 33

vs .
RON WHITEHE^ii . AA4 GODFh.
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN,
ROSELYN KIRK and DON HALE,
M e m b e r s S a ]* Vi V •- "* n ; p - -'
Def enda::: s-Auoei . JP. t..
De f enda::* s A p p e I .a-i t. s , : n- C1 ^ y "our -:."!
" r^terreo

r t^-- ,; i ainti f : s / Aooel : o e s

< v - o +• c;

Cdli

of Utah, Amicus Curiae

{"ACLU

v rererre-:

^ i <

Livii

juxDc^il t i 6 ^ >

wHioIl

).
I.

RESPONSE TO THE SEPARATIONISTS'
STATEMENT REGARDING ISSUES IN THIS CASE
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While the Separationists may wish to keep the issue overly
narrowed, they have brought upon themselves the necessity for
considering the other issues by virtue of their tactics and
pleadings below.

It would be most unfortunate for this Court to

leave local government and local government counsel without this
Court's guidance on all the important matters presented here.
II.
RESPONSE TO THE SEPARATIONISTS'
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial
Administration and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
governed the proceedings below, the Council Members submitted to
the lower court in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment
27 numbered paragraphs of Undisputed Facts. All were thoroughly
documented with admissible evidence.

(R. 192-203 and 233-487.)

The Separationists, in their Memorandum in Support of their
Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted absolutely no facts.

(See

Separationists' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, R.
501-522.)
Early on in the litigation below, considerably before either
party had filed any motions for summary judgment, the
Separationists submitted a free-standing "Statement of Undisputed
Facts".

(R. 61-7.)

The "Statement" is almost a paragraph-by-

paragraph recitation of the plaintiffs' Complaint including such
supposed "facts" as the unsubstantiated "fact" that the
"[Separationists] are entitled to a permanent injunction . . . ."
Later, contemporaneously with their Memorandum in Support of
2
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ARGUMENT
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ANY JUDICIAL PRESUMPTION OF "A IDITY OF
DEFERENCE IS WRONG AND IT MANIFESTS A BA^.^
MISUNDERSTANDING OF A MUNICIPAL COUNCIL'S
In violation of Rule 24;*-: , Utdi, R * Apt-. „;
Separationists railed to provide this Court. *vith the record
citations for the City's objection to thi~ attempt to improperly
introduce non-evidence into the record. -R. 4?6-7, 5 34-5, 5 37-9
and 747-9.- The Separationists make trie same error In failing to
creseiv the Court with the record citations to the CouncL
^bject.ions tc the Wisn»~ expert philosooher affidavit.
t;re Councii Memcei^ «.i . + ^-•„^J._,„ _,, j beparat^cnist^
i. unsel's continuing efforts to obscure the import a: *
u rstitutional Issues involved here bv i^r-rop^r .nnuenac -.'4a.:
tne Council.
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RELATIONSHIP TO THE COURTS.
The ACLU states that it is "patently absurd" to grant any
judicial deference or extend the presumption of constitutionality
of the legislative acts of the elected legislators of Salt Lake
City.

(ACLU Brief, p. 4.)

This trivialization of the important

role of local government in the State is a manifestation of the
Separationists', the ACLU's and the lower court's
misunderstanding of the legitimate function of local
government.3

Further, this abrasive, but candid statement by

the ACLU is near the heart of the lower court's errors and is,
therefore, in need of this response.
First, contrary to the assertion by the ACLU, the Council
Members have never claimed that they are not "accountable to this
Court".

(ACLU, p. 4.)

The Council Members have and do here

assert that as elected legislators of Salt Lake City, their
legislative acts and decisions are presumptively constitutional
and the Separationists have the burden of proving any claimed
unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.
Members' original Brief, Point III, p. 40.)

(See Council

Case law

demonstrates that it is a universally accepted rule in this
country that municipal legislative acts, like State statutes, are

3

The lower court gave lip service to the concept of granting
deference to the Council. (Memorandum Decision, p. 13.
Attachment 2 to the Council Members' original Brief. R. 990.)
However, it failed, in fact, to give such a presumption of
validity or any deference whatsoever to the City Council's
legislative acts. In addition, it totally ignored the individual
Council Member's legislative immunity from personal liability,
and their Speech and Debate Privileges. See Point II, below.

4
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powers is presumably constitutional ^nd bindinc
The presumption is that the local legislative
ouay intended not to violate the Constitution, but to
enact a valid ordinance within the scope of its
constitutional powers. [ 1 It has been declared that
the presumption attaches to a municipal ordinance as
strongly as it does to a fstate! legislative enactment.

Not only must unconstitutional,..- ^ .••.*. .^aixy,
it has been asserted, it must appear -ina be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. [ j If the constitutional
questions raised are fairly decatabi^.. -he court must
declare the ordinance con^-^;:- ^ - -. ' -~ -he court
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cannot and must not substitute its judgment for that of
the local legislative body.
Id. at §19.06, pp. 512-513.

(Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.)

Although Savage and McQuillin discuss the presumption of
constitutionality afforded to municipal "ordinances", the
rationale is equally applicable to municipal legislative actions
evidenced by the adoption of a legislative "resolution".

This

observation is compelled by the fact that a "resolution" is, just
like an "ordinance", a legislative enactment.

Reynolds, Local

Government Law, 182-183 (West Publishing Co. 1982).

Similarly,

commentators have noted that the distinction between an
"ordinance" and a legislative action adopted by a "resolution"
can be one of form rather than substance.4

4

Utah statutes specifically provide that "resolutions" shall
be in the same form as "ordinances" and that votes for each shall
be by roll call. §§10-3-506, 717 and 718, U.C.A., 1953.
Further, even though legislative power is usually exercised by
ordinances (especially where criminal sanctions, fines or
forfeitures are to be employed), the law permits the legislative
body to exercise certain administrative and legislative powers by
adoption of a "resolution". §10-3-717, U.C.A., 1953. The
ultimate power of any legislature, the adoption of a budget, can
be exercised in Utah cities by either ordinance or resolution.
§10-6-118, U.C.A., 1953. Under Salt Lake City's optional
Council-Strong Mayor form of governance the City Council is
limited to only performing legislative powers. Martindale v.
Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Utah 1978).
Also, while the final results of legislative ordinances have
their primary effect on the public at large, the internal
workings and procedures of the legislature act primary upon
itself, as a separate and co-equal branch of government. This
difference underscores this Court's duty to defer to the
legislative body's decisions concerning its own internal
procedures. See Mecham v. Gordon, 156 Ariz. 297, 751 P.2d 957,
962-3 (1988); Beitelspacher v. Risch, 105 Idaho 65, 671 P.2d 1068
(1983) .

6

This Court has recognized the important: role of local
government in Utah and held that local legislative bodies are
fully empowered to exercise their jurisdiction to solve, with
creativity and distinction, pressi rig social problems
Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980).

State v.

Salt Lake City has the

constitutional dignity -if being designated as the State's
capital.

(Article XXII, Section

Utah Constitution )

la

addition, the Constitution grants home rule powers to cities by
specifical 1 y 1 imitirig 11 ie powei: of t: 1 ie State 1 egislature to
delegate "municipal functions" to others.
28, Utah Constitution.)

(Article VI, Section

It also prohibits the legislature from

granting franchise or i nterfering with cities' rights-of-way,
(Article VII, Section 8, Utah Constitution.)
Ir -.:.-•••

"ait Lake City Council is not a rag-tag foster

child of the State as suggested by the ACE .U.
is entitled *
elected ^

•

Rathe- . tr>-

- - Til

* r>- tignity ai.d respect of a legislative body
•

•* •

State.

The failure of the lower

court and the other parties to this litigation to accept tf lis
fact is a mind-set that has partially led to the error below.
The Council Members respec : .

:.-

address this issue in its decision

.
/:.*•

>nrt- t . soec;_f ically
Lty Council ^

legislative acts must be afforded the deference and give *. :e
presumptions of validity to wh I ch tl ley are enti t:i•-»<- r-<i-- :ne
separation of powers concept.

7

POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT JUDGMENT AND ORDER, DIRECTED
AGAINST INDIVIDUAL COUNCIL MEMBERS, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Separationists' Brief undertakes a radical 180 degree
change of position from that earlier taken in the lower court and
in a motion filed with this Court in June.

They now assert that

it is their "understanding" that the lower court's Order only
enjoins the City Council, as an institution, and does not affect
the respondent-Council Members as individuals.5
The Separationists' vigorously argued a contrary position
before the lower court.

For example, when the City Council

Members answered the Separationists' interrogatories, they did so
by majority vote and as a Council action, consistent with their
expectation that they had been sued in a representative
capacity.6

The Separationists objected and filed a Motion

before the lower court to have each Council Member answer
individually, under oath, on the premise that they had been sued
as individuals.

The lower court ruled with the Separationists

and ordered that the Answers to Interrogatories be refiled, with

5

See Separationists' Brief, p. 7-8, footnote 3. Also, note
the term "Council" in the Brief. See for example:
Separationists' Brief p. 11, 13, 15. Previously, the
Separationists referred only to the Council Members, as
individuals.
6

In violation of Rule 4-502(3), C.J.A., the Separationists
failed to provide the lower court with the Council Members'
original Answers in their Motion to Compel which are, therefore,
not in the record. See the Council Members' Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Compel. R. 719-23.

8

each Council Member signing individually.7
Following the lower court's Memorandum Decision, the
Separationists filed a Proposed Order,

The Council Members

objected to this document, among other reasons, because it
applied to then as Individuals and, thus, violated their
constit ,:;LOL.,

,-:r< -

•• se.i for the Separationists again

insisted that the Council Members were sued as inc. . ;ud.required that a judgment for costs be granted against each
Member, including Torn Uudfrey and N.irv'v' P.icn who had voted
against the Council's opening ceremony policy.

Again, the lower

court accepted the Separationists' position and entered the
Order, as proposed.9
As late as June 1992, counsel for the Separationists
asserted before uiis Court that only the individuals were being
sued.10

In its Motion to Dismiss this appeal, tt le

Separationists succinctly stated:
7. Plaintiffs' [Separationists] complaint names the
defendants individually, and seeks relief from them in
7

See Separationists' Motion to Compel, the various relevant
memoranda, and the Court's subsequent Order; R.7 05-7, 719-2 3,
730-3, 740 and 750-2.
8

See, Defendants' "Objection to Plaintiff's Proposed Order
Granting Summary Judgment and Motion for Clarification of
Memorandum Decision", R. 999-1006 and annexed as Attachment 3 to
the Council Members' original Brief. Compare the Separationists'
response below, R. 1016-31, included as Attachment "1" to this
Brief.
9

k

See "Order Granting Summary Judgment" dated April 9, 1992
1055-8; Attachment "4" to the Council Members' original Brief.
10

See Separationists' "Motion to Dismiss Appeal
this Court dated June 2, 1992, OT7-13, 18-20.
9

filed with

their individual capacity only.
8. The relief sought . • . seeks to bind only the
individually named defendants [Council Members] . . .,
not successor Council Members or the municipal
corporation.

18. The Salt Lake City Council is not a party to this
lawsuit.
(Empha s i s added.)
The result was that each Council Member was compelled to
appeal in order to avoid attachment of their personal assets to
pay the judgment for costs.11

The Court can deduce from the

different filing dates and the limited purpose filing of Council
Members Pace and Godfrey that they were compelled to appeal to
avoid paying a judgment or having their assets attached.
The Separationists' dramatic shift of position in their
Brief filed with this Court is, in effect, a confession of error
below.

It is an acknowledgment by the Separationists' counsel

that the Order he prepared and had signed by the lower court,
over the objection of the Council Members, is overbroad and
violates the individual Council Member's free speech rights and
their legislative immunities.12 As such, the lower court's
Order and Judgment should be summarily reversed.
This concession also renders the remainder of this appeal
L1

A11 Council Members, except Godfrey and Pace, filed their
Notice of Appeal on May 1, 1992. Council Members Pace and
Godfrey filed May 8, 1992, one day before the appeal deadline and
only on the cost judgment rendered against them.
I2

See Council Members' original Brief, Point I and V for
detailed discussion.
10

moot because wi thout I in* individual dPt^ndrint-s , the

Separa*tionists

have nc other

their own admission.

party

remaining

in the suit,

by

However, this Coutt may elect to render a

decision on the merits because tl lis is ^ matter of too great a
public importance to not be judicially tesolved.

Kennecott Corp.

v. Salt Lake County, 7 02 P.2a 4ji (Utah 1985).
Whichever course this Court elects, i i. J S important, tor
policy reasons related to the role of municipal government in
this Statf.
liability

..--•
A. .

• . ^ :-. : -J * . - - *

* - m personal

r. . prevent any future . •,_ ^pg effect nn thp

performance of legislators' functions, the decision of this Co.rt
should specifically reverse the lower oourt Order, wh I

v

_J -es

the Council Members' legislative immunities and Speech a: . Debate
Privi l^ges, •
POINT III.
THE APPROPRIATE STANDARDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION REQUIRE A MULTI-FACETED
ANALYSIS AND NOT THE APPLICATION OF STATUTORY
"PLAIN MEANING" STANDARD.
AX)Lh trie bepdrdiiorii SLS -unl I be ACl.u premise much of their
argumerit on the assertion that a statutory rule of construction,
called the "plain meaning rule", is directly applicable tc

constitutional

interpsf?±.2t±;s:?

,v: fact,

the Separar • jnzscs

and

the ACI,u even cite cases interpreting a 'statute."13
'^'-"Uiie commentators more succinctly call this type of
/ ^or example, see Separationists' Point 1(A) addressing
"legislative intent", as opposed to constitutional construction
principles. Separationists' Bri ef, pp .] 5-19; ACLU Brief, pp. 5-

ii

constitutional interpretation:

"Clause Bound Textualism."1A

It

is a minority position and a discredited method of constitutional
analysis.

It fails to receive wide acceptance on many counts,

including the fact that standing alone (except in rare cases
where the context shows "crystal clear" intent) words all have
variable and uncertain meanings.15

Under this improper method

of constitutional interpretation, the basic political philosophy
of governance and construction of civil rights issues are decided
only by the Court's importing whatever meaning it chooses to the
words at issue, without reference to the historical context or
other rationale.

This methodology places the Court in a dubious

position of autocratic authoritarianism, where things are so
simply because a majority of a Court says they are so.

It

undercuts the credibility of the Court as a deliberative
institution whose rulings should be based on reason and whose
rulings are subject to the constraints of historical precedent
and stare decisis, rather than acting as a free-standing
constitutional convention.
There are numerous other schools of thought concerning
constitutional interpretation.

These that range from those

14

Stewart, The Art of Constitutional Interpretation, 17
Journal of Contemporary Law, 91 (1991).
15

The Separationists' strange ad horendum arguments
regarding womens' suffrage and polygamy are specious.
(Separationists, pp. 21-22.) The Constitution specifically
prohibits polygamy and allows women to vote. If these matters
ever came before this Court the multi-faceted analysis suggested
here by the Council Members would result in the correct
interpretation.

12

propounded by Ed Meese to those of Lawrence Tribe and beyonu.
Various descriptive handles are applied to these theories,
including:

"originalism", " i nterpretational Isni" and

"principalism",

The latter of these promotes the theory that a

constitution .should bo construed to give a clause the mostmorality or integrity, as defined by the judges
decision.16

••IA.

,•, :; -

To some degree, this methodology io philosophical

and esoteric, .10

.... :. ;i-- o;.

.: i-....-

s ana other

constitutional cases•
Contrary to the assertion of the Separationists and the
ACLU, the Council Members have never iss^.5 .-

\o

the

"subjective" intent o: :.ho ; ramers ^a - 1o~ ne considered.
the 'iVuinoil Members •• -

r>

-:

4

Rather,

o-^ •. urged a. multi-faceted

interpretive procedure, which uses as its primary touchstone the
original "intent" and "purpose" of the constitutional provision
at issue.

These are to be ascertained i- r«mi history, foundational

principles, stare decisis, evaluation ui federal and other State
analogiles, balancing competing constitutional values and the
language employed,l7
This balanced evaluation, with its touchstone on intent and
purpose, is a method t .hat most courts have adopted and one to
16

See R. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict, 10 (1991);
Clor, Constitutional Interpretation and Regimen Disciplines, in
The Constitution, The Courts and the Quest for Justice, 115
(Goldwin and Schambra Eds. 1989); McDowell, Id. at 17; Perry, Id.
at 70; Tribe and Dorf, On Reading the Constitution, 71 {1991); W,
Murphy J. Fleming and W. Harris, American Constitutional
Interpretation, 289 (The Foundation Press, 1986).
17

See Council Members' original Brief, Points
13

T

=snd II

which this Court has subscribed.

The so-called "plain meaning"

(Clause Bound Textualism) urged by the Separationists and ACLU
would be a most restrictive and inappropriate standard for this
Court to adopt, and one which these parties would inevitably seek
to change in future disputes. At least this writer would be
surprised and disappointed if the ACLU, in another case, would
really urge such a restrictive position.

For example, it is hard

to believe that Utah would wish the "no" in either the First
Amendment or Article I, Section 15 to be read with its Webster's
Dictionary meaning and have this Court (under the "plain meaning
rule") void all laws concerning libel and slander; State security
secrets; child pornography; obscenity; trade secrets; and all
reasonable time, place and manner controls regarding expressive
activity.

The writer would be even more astonished if the ACLU

seriously urged this Court to read "speech" to be limited to the
spoken word, to the exclusion of constitutional protection for
other communicative actions.18' 19
Further, notwithstanding the ACLU's and Separationists'
protestations in the case at bar about "plain meaning", the cases

18

See text of Article I, Section 15, Constitution of Utah.

19

Many basic civil liberties are included under what
come to be known as "penumbral" rights. Privacy, travel
other such rights are premised on the argument that they
inferred and read into various constitutional provisions
the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments pursuant to the
unexpressed intent and purpose of the Framers.

14

have
and
can be
such as

cited by them did not stand for the position .ii ^sert-.^d.20 To the
contrary, this Court has affirmed its view that constitutional
interpretation

i>; >\ multi-faceted analysis that seeks to

determine the intent and purpose of the framers.21

For examp] e, •

in addressing the importance of developing law under the Utah
Constitutioi 1, 11 11s Coi :i i: t annt;»n.need that local counsel should give
serious consideration to State constitutional concepts, as
opposK : r

":>lisLic reliance on their federal counterparts.

In

doing so, this Court cited with approval !;h>: summary of the
scholarly commentary and analytic techniques set forth by the
Supreme Com I ot Vermont,,

State v. Earl, 716 P. 2d 803 (Utah

20

See discussion of Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464
P.2d 378 (1970), and other cases cited by ACLU and Separationists
in the Council Members' original Brief at p. 18-27. The ACLU
continues to misstate the holding of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in Re Initiative Petition No. 281, State Question No. 441 v.
Rogers, 434 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1967). (ACLU, p. 6.) The ACLU
implies that the Oklahoma Supreme Court gave first priority, as a
rule of interpretation, to the "plain meaning" rule. In fact,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court held clearly that "plain meaning" was
only one way of determining constitutional intent, It was the
discernment of constitutional intent which was the primary rule
of constitutional Interpretation. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
held:
The first rule for construing constitutional
provisions, to which all other rules of construction
are subordinate, is that the meaning, as understood by
those who framed and adopted the Constitution, is to be
ascertained and given effect.
Id. at 951.

(Emphasis added.)

21

Counsel for the Council Members acknowledges the
assistance in preparing this analysis of an article to be
published in the University of Utah Law Review approximately
Thanksgiving by Brad C. Smith, "Be No More Children": An Analysis
of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, 199 2 Utah
L. Rev
15

1986) citing State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985).

See also,

State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990).22
The Supreme Court of Vermont's analysis in Jewett begins by
recognizing the importance of not simply looking at only the
plain words of a constitutional provision.

The Vermont Court

quotes with approval to Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes writing that:
Historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is
a necessity. . . .
Jewett, id. at p. 236. Justice Holmes is also quoted as follows:
The provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical
formulas having their essence in their form; they are
organic living institutions transplanted from English
soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to
be gathered not simply by taking the words and a
dictionary, but by considering their origin and the
line of their growth.
Jewett, jji. at 236.

(Citation omitted.)

22

The Court of Appeals cautioned in Bobo that the
"thoughtful and probing analysis of State constitutional
interpretation" should be begun before the trial court. (JEd. at
1273.) The Council Members respectfully submit that they
fulfilled this "thoughtful and probing analysis" before the trial
court with a detailed historical and legal explanation of Article
I, Section 4. (R. 192-203, 233-487 and 628-31.)
The Court of Appeals sets out three independent steps.
First, the Court of Appeals stated that "counsel should offer
analysis of the unique context in which Utah's constitution
developed. . . . "
(Jd. at 1272-3, fn. 5, citations omitted.)
Second, "counsel should demonstrate that state appellate courts
regularly interpret even textually similar state constitutional
provisions in a manner different from federal interpretations of
the United States Constitution and that it is entirely proper to
do so in our federal system." (Id., citations omitted.)
Finally, "citation should be made to authority from other states
supporting the particular construction urged by counsel. . . ;
[particular attention should be given to those states whose
constitutions served as a model for the Utah Constitution."
(JEd.. , citations omitted.)
16

The Vermont Supreme Court concluded it 5 d.srussion uf this
style of constitutional interpretation as follows:
Historical argument may also touch upon the legislative
history of a particular provision, "or on the social
and political setting in which it originated, or on the
fate of the [provision] in subsequent constitutions."
Jewett, 500 A.2d at 236,

(Citation footnote omitted.)

Jewett, after recognizing the primacy of historical
argument, then noted that const: 1 t;ut i.oiw 1 iirgument* may also be
made from the text: of the provision itself and by the
construct..;

. '

• 'iiar provisions by "sibling" states.

(Id. at 237-8.)
In point of fact, the use of historical devices and a multifaceted evaluation in construing UT"" Utah Constitution is not
some newly discovered principle.

It nas been the rule in Utah

almost as lonq as Utah has been a state.

For: example, in People

ex rel. O'Meara v. City Council of Salt Lake Ci'-

' Utah 13, 64

x. 460 (Utah 1900), this Court considered whether A statute,
passed by tho leq is 1 attire authorizing the issuance of bonds r\<
Salt Lake City for a water system, violated tl le de;
provisions of Article XIV, Section 4 of the Constitution

- -.:
In

construing 11 1 e Consti tu11 on to permit the City's bono issuance,
this Court extensively considered the history of
constitutional provision at issue in .1 ight of the constitutional
framers' knowledge oj extstiiiq < 01 roumstanoes and their intent.
The Court held:
Those who framed the fundamental law, however, were
confronted with the conditions and necessities with
growing cities, and must be presumed to have had
17

knowledge of the fact, because a matter of current
history, that some of them already had existing debts
in amount largely in excess of the 4% limit, and yet
had an entirely inadequate supply of water, light and
sewer facilities.
•

*

*

In interpreting [the constitutional provision at issue]
and ascertaining [its] meaning as used, it becomes
important to consider, in the light of the conditions
and growing necessities of the municipalities, the
scope and purpose of the entire provision.
"Constitutions are not to be interpreted alone by their
words abstractly considered, but by their words read in
light of the conditions and necessities in which the
provisions originated, and in view of the purposes
sought to be attained and secured."
(Id. at 462, citations omitted, emphasis added.)
Similarly, in Brummitt v. Ogden Water Works Co., 33 Utah
285, 93 P. 828 (Utah 1908), this Court considered whether or not
the continuance of a water contract (originally entered into
prior to the Constitution) violated the provisions of Article XI,
Section 6, regarding municipal water rights.

In holding that the

challenged action was constitutional, this Court explained that
it was not legalizing an action which violated the Constitution.
Instead, it was using the facts that were deemed relevant, which
existed at the time the Constitution was adopted, to interpret
the Constitution.

The Court held:

But what we mean is that, when it is clear that the
facts complained of were not intended as an evasion or
have in any manner violated the spirit of the
Constitution, then the acts will be upheld, unless such
acts are clearly prohibited by the language contained
in the Constitution. In other words, the acts must
fall within the spirit of the constitutional
inhibition, and not merely within the name applied to
them.

18

(Id. at p. 837, emphasis added.)23
In sum, it is respectfully submitted that the statutory rule
of construction known as "plain meaning", or its constitutional
counterpart, "Clause Bound Textualism", is not the appropriate
tool of analysis in this case.

It is not and has never been the

rule of constitutional construction in Utah, nor is it in the
vast majority of jurisdictions.

The lower court was in error

when it adopted, at the urging of the Separationists and the
ACLU, such a narrow and one-dimensional form of analysis.

This

Court should apply its historic multi-faceted analysis, as urged
in Council Members' original Brief, Points I and II.
POINT IV
THE SCHOOL GRADUATION PRAYER AND FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE CASES CITED BY THE SEPARATIONISTS
AND THE ACLU ARE NOT RELEVANT TO THIS COURT'S
ANALYSIS HERE.
The Separationists and the ACLU cite graduation school
prayer and parochial financial assistance cases from a few other
states to support their argument that legislative opening
ceremonies, with an invocation, are barred under the Utah
Constitution.

In doing so, they only cite those cases holding a

23

See, also, Cooper v. Utah Light and Ry. Co., 35 Utah 570,
102 P. 202 (1909) where this Court considered the meaning of the
words "any" and "franchise" as they related to corporations under
the Constitution. This Court held that, as here, the
constitutional provision in question was not clear. Accordingly,
this Court was under a duty to provide the provision with a
meaning and effect. In doing so this Court specifically stated
that it was "permitted to notice the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention" and to interpret the words as it
"fairly appears that the words were so used and [with] such a
meaning [as] was intended." JW. at 208.
19

particular practice invalid and, more importantly, fail to note
the different policy and legal issues in a legislative context,
similar to the case at bar.24 This weakness is underscored by
the fact that, despite a 200 year history of legislative prayer
across the country and the many identical or more restrictive
clauses of state constitutions,25 the ACLU and the
Separationists have never cited any case on point striking down
the common practice of prayer by municipal, state or county
governments.26,

27

By way of illustration, the major cases cited

by the Separationists and the ACLU will be discussed below.
The California cases cited by the Separationists, Sands v.
Moronqo Unified School District, 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991) and
California Teachers Association v. Riles, 632 P.2d 953 (Cal.

24

See analogous State constitutional provisions attached in
Attachment R-2.
25

See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019
(1983) .
26

0n page 26 of its Brief, the Separationists contend that
"[t]he courts in these states [with provisions similar to Article
I, Section 4] have upheld the rigorous language of state
provisions and have repeatedly enforced and [sic] the strict noaid mandates." This contention is totally unsubstantiated.
While a few courts from other states have ruled that prayer at
high school graduations violate those particular state's
constitutional provisions (with other courts ruling to the
contrary) these decisions come nowhere close to the
Separationists' overwrought generalization.
27

Research has disclosed only one other case anywhere in the
United States challenging municipal prayer practices and that was
under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. Marsa v.
Wernik, 86 N.J. 232, 430 A.2d 888 (N.J. 1981) cert, den'd 454
U.S. 958 (1981). Even though Marsa was decided before Marsh, the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the practice of prayer under an
analysis very similar to that discussed in Point VI, below.
20

1981) are completely irrelevant to the issue before this Court,
In Riles, the Supreme Court of California found that the practice
of lending, without charge, textbooks used in public schools to
students attending parochial schools violated the California
constitutional provision against supporting sectarian or
denominational schools.
§8.)

(California Constitution, Article IX,

This "support of sectarian schools" provision is of no

benefit to the Separationists in the case now before this Court
because of totally different constitutional provision and
operative facts.28
In Sands, the California Supreme Court held that high school
graduation ceremony prayers violated the establishment clause of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The

California Supreme Court was also asked to consider whether
graduation school prayer violated various provisions of the
California Constitution.

Three justices concluded that the

practice violated the State Constitution, two concluded that it
did not, and two declined to reach the state constitutional
issues.

(Jd. at 833, Chief Justice Lucas, concurring).29

28

This same weakness also applies to government sponsored
religious display cases cited by the Separationists, Fox v. City
of Los Angeles, 587 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1978) and Okrand v. City of
Los Angeles, 207 Cal.App.3d 566 (Cal.Ct.App. 1989).
(Separationists, p. 39.)
29

Under the constitutional law of California, the three
justice opinion was not binding even in California. Id., citing:
County of San Mateo v. Del J., 46 Cal.3d 1236, 1241-1242, fn. 5 &
1249-50, 762 P.2d 1202; Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674,
679, 59 P.2d 144 (1936); and, Farrell v. Board of Trustees, 85
Cal. 408, 415-416, 24 P. 868 (1890).
21

More importantly, the California Supreme Court in Sands went
out of its way to distinguish the "legislative prayer" tradition
approved in Marsh v. Chambers, supra, from graduation prayer.

As

the three Justice opinion of Justice Kennard noted:
Marsh, . . . is properly understood as deriving in part
from the judiciary's deference to the legislative
branch in the management of that branch's own internal
affairs (see Van Zandt v. Thompson, (7th Cir. 1988) 839
F.2d 1215, 1219), a deference not implicated in this
case.
Sands, supra at 819, fn. 9.

(Emphasis added.)30

Of course, in the instant case, the judiciary's deference to
the legislative branch is. at issue.

This Court must take every

reasonable step possible to uphold the actions of a co-equal
branch of government and presume such actions to be
constitutional, unless the Separationists show beyond a
reasonable doubt that such actions are unconstitutional.
Point I, above.)

(See

The Separationists and the ACLU have not met

this burden.
Similar weaknesses infect the ACLU's and the Separationists'
reliance on cases from the State of Washington.

The

constitutional provisions in Washington related to religion have
been extensively analyzed by Washington Supreme Court Justice,
Robert F. Utter and University of Georgia Professor Edward J.
Larsen, in:

Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the

Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15

30

See the discussion of the relationship between Marsh and
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) at fn. 44
below.
22

Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 451 (1988) ("Church and
State").

Justice Utter and Professor Larsen begin their analysis

by noting, similar to the discussion in Point III above, that
there is an on-going scholarly dispute regarding the principles
of state constitutional interpretation.

(Church and State, p.

452-58.) Without reciting the analysis in it full detail,
certain basic principles apply in both Washington and Utah.

For

example, the article noted:
Constitutional interpretations inevitably involve some
consideration of the intent of the Framers. As a
practical matter, the history behind the provisions of
the Constitution influences constitutional
interpretation even if it does not control it.
(Id. at 455, footnotes omitted, emphasis added.)
Under Washington law, state courts must construe the
words of the state constitution according to their
common and ordinary meaning at the time the particular
provision was adopted. Courts must look to the meaning
that the words would have had to the vast majority of
ordinary voters, not merely to the drafters.
(Id. at 457-58, footnotes omitted, emphasis added.)
Justice Utter and Professor Larsen then proceed to analyze
the history behind Washington's Article I, Section 11, the direct
ancestor of Utah's similar provision at issue here.

Beyond any

doubt, Justice Utter and Professor Larsen establish that
Washington's Article I, Section 11 was placed in the State's
Constitution at the insistence of United States Congress to
restrict the establishment of sectarian schools and not as a
manifestation as hostility toward religion generally.

23

(Church

and State, p. 472.)31
issue in this lawsuit

Specifically, discussing the clause at
(no public financing for any religious

worship, exercise or instruction), Justice Utter and Professor
Larsen recognized the clause as "address[ing] the basic objective
of • . . preventing state funding for parochial education
activities."

(JW.)

Church and State analyses the provision as follows:
[The drafter of an earlier amendment] had no intended
this objective to reflect a hostility toward religion.
Given the debate on the preamble, neither did the
convention.
(Id. at 473, footnotes omitted.)
Justice Utter and Professor Larsen then conclude their
analysis of the relationship between the Washington State
Constitution and religion with language instructive to this
Court:
Far from being hostile to religion, the framers viewed
religion as an important component of a stable society.
They voted overwhelmingly to express gratitude to the
deity for their liberties. They authorized tax
exemptions for church property. They declined to
prohibit religious influence in public education. In
each instance, delegates spoke warmly of religion as
setting an example for youth, contributing a positive
moral force to society, and providing a welcome
positive influence for students. Yet, they were
exceedingly careful to purify this state-sanctioned
religion from any taint of sectarianism. Rather than
accept a reference to God in the preamble, as some
proposed, they hailed instead a generic Supreme Ruler
of the Universe. Public support for sectarian
activities such as religious worship, exercise, and
instruction was prohibited. Sectarian control and
influence was forever barred from public schools. In
31

In fact, the Washington Constitutional Convention
expressly rejected a "freedom from religion" provision
recommended to it by a prominent local newspaper. (Id.)
24

distinguishing between religion and sectarianism in the
schools, the framers comported with the 50-year-old
common school movement.
(Id. at 477-8, footnotes omitted, emphasis added.)
Given this clear constitutional history, the Washington
school assistance cases cited by the ACLU and the Separationists
simply cannot be read to support an argument rendering the City
Council's practice of prayer unconstitutional in this case.

In

light of Washington's own constitutional history, the holdings in
the cases cited by the Separationists and the ACLU are far from
surprising.

It is also predictable from this analysis that the

Washington Legislature's opening prayers and those of Washington
cities like Spokane are constitutional.32
In Witters v. State Commission for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119
(Wash. 1989),33 the Supreme Court of Washington considered
whether or not the State was required or allowed to provide
financial assistance for a visually handicapped student.

The

student wanted to attend a private Bible College with the goal of
becoming a pastor, missionary or church youth director.

The

support was challenged as violating the Washington constitutional
provision prohibiting any public money from being applied to

32
See
M

pp. 12 and 31 of City Council's Brief and Exhibits
"X", Y" and "Z" below (R. 791-804) documenting Washington's
historical and current practice of legislative prayer.
33

Cited by the ACLU at p. 13; the Separationists at pp. 9
and 29.

25

religious instruction.
§11.3A

Washington Constitution, Article 1,

The Washington Supreme Court concluded, rather

obviously, that providing state financial assistance to attend a
Bible College constituted support of "religious . . .
instruction."
In the instant case, the Salt Lake City Council is not
providing any appropriations for any similar religious
instruction to an individual or an institution.

In fact, it is

undisputed that there is no appropriation at all and that the
Council's Opening Ceremony involves broad community
participation, including non-religious thoughts and
meditations.35

Even a "prayer's" content is specifically

outside of Council concern.

(See the Policy included as

Attachment "1" to the Council Members' original Brief.)

Thus,

there is no similarity of either the facts or the constitutional
issues involved between Witters and the case now before this
Court.
Another case cited by the ACLU and the Separationists from
Washington is similarly unavailing.

In Weiss v. Bruno, 509 P.2d

3A

The 1989 Witters decision of the Washington Supreme Court
followed a remand from the United States Supreme Court in Witters
v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
88 L.Ed.2d 846 (1986), where the United States Supreme Court
decided that such payments did not violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
35

It is interesting to note that the Separationists, which
admitted at oral argument on this matter below, that the City
Council's expenditures were de minimis, has somehow now abandoned
this de minimis standard when referencing the judgment rendered
against individual Council Members below.
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973 (Wash. 1973),36 the Washington Supreme Court held that
statutes providing financial assistance for needy and
disadvantaged children attending private schools violated the
provisions of Article IX, §4 of the Washington Constitution,
which prohibits public funds from being spent on schools with
"sectarian control or influence."

Such a conclusion, under a

completely different constitutional provision, is irrelevant to
the case before this Court.

In fact, the Washington Supreme

Court declined to consider whether or not the challenged practice
violated Article 1, §11 of the Washington Constitution (the
progenitor of Article I, §4 of the Utah Constitution), upon which
the Separationists base their challenge here.

Weiss, supra at

977.37
Finally, the Separationists and the ACLU rely on Kay v.
David Douglas School District No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or.App.
1986).38

However, Kay proves far more than the Separationists

or the ACLU desire. Again, Kay involved a challenge to high
school graduation ceremonial prayer.

The Oregon Court of Appeals

held that such prayer violated Article I, §§2 and 5 of the Oregon
Constitution.

Oregon's Article I, Section 2 reads:

All men shall be secure in the Natural right, to
36

Separationists, pp. 28 and 30.

37

The school busing cases from Washington relied upon by the
Separationists are also unhelpful for the same reasons. Mitchell
v. Consolidated School District No. 201, 135 P.2d 79 (Wash. 1943)
and Visser v. Nooksack Valley School District No. 506, 207 P.2d
198 (Wash. 1949). (Separationists, p. 9.)
38

Separationists, pp. 9 and 40; ACLU, p. 10.
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worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences.
Explicitly relying upon history from the Oregon Constitutional
Convention, and acknowledging that Article I, §2 went a step
beyond "other constitutions" in effecting a separation of church
and state, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that graduation
prayer violated this "complete divorce" of church and state.
Id., 880, fn. 6.

Thus, contrary to the urgings of the

Separationists and the ACLU on this Court, Oregon expressly
considered the history of the constitutional provision at issue.
Further, Article I, §5 of the Oregon Constitution (a rough
analog to Article I, §4 of the Utah Constitution) contains a most
interesting difference from Utah's Constitution.

A clause which

is not found in Utah's Constitution specifically prohibits:
Any money befinql appropriated for the payment of any
reliqeous fsicl service in either house of the
Legislative Assembly.
(Emphasis added.)
Utah, in adopting its Constitution, could have adopted the
Oregon model with its specific prohibition on legislative prayer.
Instead, Utah chose to adopt the Washington provision which has
no such specific provision.
was done advisedly.39

It must be presumed that this choice

As such, this conscious omission adds

weight to the conclusion that Utah's Article I, §4 was designed
to permit Utah's longstanding practice from prayers in opening

'Hanson v. Owens, 619 P.2d 315 (Utah 1980).
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legislative sessions, both at municipal and state levels/0'
The most telling weakness of the Separationists' and the
ACLU's position is the fact that they must attempt to analogize
from other state constitutions concerning school graduation
prayer cases which is simply not at issue here. Marsh
conclusively demonstrates that the practice of legislative prayer
is more than common; it is the norm in state and local
governments across the country and has been for 200 years. As
demonstrated in ACLU's own Brief's Appendix, and Attachment "2"
of this Brief, virtually every state has constitutional language
substantially similar and, in many cases more stringent, than
Utah's Article I, Section 4.42 Yet, despite this fact, and the
long history of legislative prayer, there exists no case squarely
on point prohibiting it.

The cases from which the Separationists

and the ACLU attempt to analogize all concern different subjects,
different constitutional provisions and embody different

40

This omission of Oregon's explicit prohibition on
legislative religious activity is further evidence of the
weakness of the ACLU's argument that "almost every imaginable
protection for religious freedom and injunction against the union
of church and state has been included. . . . "
(R. 578.)
Obviously, with all due respect to Professor Mazor who wrote the
article cited by the ACLU for this proposition, the Professor had
apparently failed to read the Oregon Constitution. See, Note,
Notes on a Bill of Rights, 1969 Utah L.Rev. 326, 331.
41

(See, e.g., Hickman at p. 72, Appendix "1" to the Council
Members' Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, discussing
the Utah Constitutional Convention's practice of adopting
provisions almost verbatim after studying the models from the
"northwest states"; R. 265.)
A2

See, also, "Be No More Children", supra, and the
analytical table in Section III(A), p.
.
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historical and legal backgrounds.
issue before this Court.

None is precedent for the

The long silence and lack of contrary

opinion regarding this tradition, in fact, speaks volumes in
favor of its validity.43
POINT V
MARSH IS NOT A "NARROW EXEMPTION" BUT INSTEAD
A FULLY APPLICABLE METHOD OF INTERPRETATION
WHICH SUPPORTS THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION.
Looking at cases construing analogous federal constitutional
provisions for guidance, as necessary under the appropriate
methodology of constitutional analysis required here, this Court
must turn to Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019
(1983).

The Separationists and the ACLU attempt to characterize

Marsh as a "careful exception" to the reach of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment and only applicable to state
legislatures.

(Separationists, p. 23; ACLU, p. 20. ) A4

The

A3

It is interesting to note that in their Brief the
Separationists rely on three Utah cases interpreting Article I,
Section 4 now claiming that the analysis in these cases supports
their position. (Separationists, pp. 42-48; citing Manning v.
Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 305, 517 P.2d 549 (Utah 1983); Gubler
v. Utah State Teachers Retirement, 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580
(1948); and, Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108,
197 P.2d 477 (1948)). In argument to the lower court the
Separationists took a contrary position stating: "[t]here is no
helpful case law in Utah construing Art. I, §4 of the Utah
Constitution." (R.714.) As noted in the Council Members'
original Brief (pp. 35-38) Thomas, Manning and Gubler support the
Council Members' position here.
4A

The ACLU wrongly cites Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
, 120
L.Ed.2d 467 (1992) as expressly restricting Marsh to "state
legislative bodies." (ACLU, p. 20, fn. 14.) Counsel for the
Council Members has diligently scoured the Lee opinion (including
running a computer search) and such a purported quote is nowhere
to be found in the opinion. Instead, the Supreme Court in Lee
distinguished Marsh based upon the formal structural distinctions
30

Separationists and the ACLU would have this Court believe that
all that the United States Supreme Court held in Marsh was that a
long tradition of violating the Constitution was somehow immune
from challenge.
This reading of Marsh is wrong because the ACLU and the
Separationists simply misstate the case. Marsh is not a "careful
exception" to the First Amendment, despite arguments in the
dissent to that effect.45

Rather, Marsh is a classic example of

the use of historical precedent to determine the intent and
purpose of the Framers of the Constitution.
As noted in Point III above, the primary rule of
constitutional interpretation, for both the Federal and State
Constitutions, is to ascertain the intent and purpose of the
drafters of a constitutional provision and the electorate in

between a state legislative opening session and a school
graduation ceremony. The Court stated:
The atmosphere at the opening of a session of a state
legislature where adults are free to enter and leave
with little comment and for any number of reasons
cannot compare with the constraining potential of the
one school event most important for the student to
attend.
Lee, 505 U.S. at
, 120 L.Ed.2d at 487. Obviously, sessions
of the Salt Lake City Council are more closely analogous to the
state legislature, with adults free to enter and leave with
little comment pursuant to a scheduled agenda, as opposed to the
unique culminating nature of a high school graduation. (See,
Fact No. 19, Council Members' original Brief, p. 9.)
45

The weakness of the Separationists' analysis of Marsh is
demonstrated by the fact that in their ten citations to Marsh
nine of them are from the dissent. The Separationists appear to
forget that it is the majority opinion which provides the
applicable federal analogue here; not the dissent.

ai

adopting it.

The question which thus faced the Court in Marsh

was whether or not the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment was intended by its Framers to prohibit legislative
prayers.
In interpreting the Establishment Clause, the Court looked
to the traditional interpretation given the Establishment Clause
by its Framers.

The Supreme Court did not hold, and the City

Council has not argued in the case, that a long tradition of
violating the Constitution would be protected.

Instead, the

Supreme Court held in Marsh that the Establishment Clause, when
interpreted in light of its intent and purposes as demonstrated
by historical usage and the Framers' understanding, simply did
not apply to the challenged ceremonial prayers.

The majority in

Marsh clearly stated:
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify
contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees,
but there is far more here than simply historical
patterns. In this context, historical evidence sheds
light not only on what the draftsman intended the
Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they
thought the Clause applied to the practice authorized
by the First Congress - their actions reveal their
intent.
Id. at 790.

(Emphasis added.)46

Because the ACLU has mischaracterized Marsh as an
"exception", as opposed to simple case of constitutional

A6

See the Council Members' original Brief at p. 35 for a
discussion of the interpretative effect of the fact that members
of the United States Constitutional Convention were involved in
the First Congresses' prayer practice as were members of Utah's
Constitutional Convention with the first Utah Legislature's
practice of prayer.
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"interpretation", the ACLU then makes the argument that this
"exception" is not applicable only to a state legislature and not
to the Salt Lake City Council.

The syllogism is faulty because

its major premise (Marsh as an "exception" rather than simply an
"interpretation" of inapplicability) is faulty.47

It is also

faulty because it is premised on their erroneous assumption that
elected City legislators are not entitled to the same respect at
law as is their State contemporaries.48
To the best of the City's knowledge, and neither the
Separationists nor the ACLU has cited cases to the contrary, no
court in the country has ruled that municipal ceremonial prayer
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment nor any
analogous state constitutional provision.49

Moreover, the

United States Supreme Court recognized in Marsh that prayers have
been traditionally offered before more than just state
legislatures.

As part of the Supreme Court's recognition of that

tradition the Court noted:

47

The same syllogistic error infects the Separationists'
claim that the City Council is not entitled to a "traditional"
"exemption" because of an interruption in the City Council's
practice of prayer. (Separationists, pp. 22-24.) The Council
Members are not trying to "legalize" any constitutionally
impermissible activity. The relevant historical practices of the
Territorial Legislature, Constitutional Convention, State
Legislature and the early history of Great Salt Lake City clearly
establish that ceremonial prayers opening legislative sessions
simply were not intended to be prohibited by Article I, Section
4.
48

See ACLU Brief, Point I and the Council Members' response,
Point I, supra.
49

See discussion of Marsa v. Wernik, supra, above.
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The opening of sessions of legislative and other
deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in
the history and tradition of this country.
Id at 7 86.

(Emphasis added.)

Because the Council Members are not claiming that the
State's long tradition of prayer somehow "exempts" them from
complying with the First Amendment or with Article I, Section 4
of the Utah Constitution, the analysis for the Separationists and
the ACLU is inappropriate and erroneous.
POINT VI
THE ACLU'S PSEUDO-LEMON ANALYSIS IS INCORRECT.
Before the lower court the ACLU attempted to rely, through
the use of various mis-citations, on the tests concerning the
First Amendment separation of Church and State found in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L.Ed.2d 745, reh'g den'd 404 U.S. 876
(1971).

(R. 584-90.)

In their Brief to this Court, the ACLU

omits literally any reference to Lemon.

However, the ACLU's

Points IV, V and VI, surreptitiously attempt to track their Lemon
analysis below.

The Council Members will, therefore,

specifically analyze the Lemon tests.
The three famous tests are found in Lemon at pp. 612 and
613.

A governmental action will not be held to violate the

Establishment Clause of the First Amendment if:
1.

The [action] has a secular purpose;

2. The [action's] principal or primary effect is not
one that either advances or inhibits religion; and,
3. The [action] does not foster an excessive
governmental entanglement with religion.
34

(Citations omitted.)

This Point will discuss these three Lemon

tests individually.50
A.
THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION SERVES LEGITIMATE
AND EXPRESSED SECULAR PURPOSES.
Without any supporting authority, the ACLU boldly claims
that M[p]rayer is, by any objective standard, a religious
exercise."

(ACLU, p. 9.)

Therefore, the ACLU claims, prayer is

an ipso facto violation of Article I, Section 4.

The Utah

Legislature, which has continued to pray from the very first day
of its existence (and which inherited this practice from the
Territorial Legislature and Constitutional Convention) obviously
does not believe that prayer is a "religious exercise" that
violates the Constitution.

The Washington State legislature and

the City Council of Spokane, which both regularly pray, also
apparently do not believe that their practice violates the
Constitution of Washington and, apparently, neither did the
Washington Constitutional Convention which also prayed.

(See

Fact No. 25 in the Council Members' original Brief referencing
Exhibits "X", "Y" and "Z" below; R. 791-804.)
While prayer may have some definitional components of
religious activity in the dictionary, that fact is not the Lemon
test.

Lemon does not say that an action of government cannot

have some incidental effect on religion.

What Lemon says is that

if the government action in question has a secular purpose, it
50

The analysis in Marsa v. Wernik, supra, is similar to that
outlined below.
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will be upheld under the first prong of the Lemon test.

The

Supreme Court clearly stated:
fTIhe statutes themselves clearly state that they are
intended to enhance the quality of the secular
education in all schools covered by the compulsory
attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the
legislatures meant anything else. . . . As in f Board
of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)] we find
nothing here that undermines the stated legislative
intent; it must therefore be accorded appropriate
deference.
Id. at 613.

(Emphasis added.)

In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984),
the United States Supreme Court went even further in explaining
its deference to the secular purpose specified by the government
in support of its actions:
The Court has invalidated legislation or governmental
action on the ground that a secular purpose was
lacking, but only when it was concluded that there was
no question that the statute or activity was motivated
wholly by religious considerations. . . . Even where
the benefits to religion were substantial . . . we saw
a secular purpose and no conflict with the
Establishment Clause.
Id. at 680.

(Extensive string citations omitted, emphasis

added.)
The City Council's opening ceremony policy recites numerous
bona fide secular purposes as the reason for its adoption.

These

include providing a moment during which Council Membesrs and the
audience can reflect on the importance of the business before the
Council; promoting an atmosphere of civility; encouraging lofty
thought and high-mindedness; recognizing cultural diversity; and
fostering sensitivity for and recognizing the uniqueness of all
segments of the community.

(See Attachment "1" to the Council
36

Members' original Brief.)

These specified secular purposes are

sufficient to pass the first Lemon test, as further explicated in
Lynch..51

Obviously, the City Council tradition is not followed

"wholly [for] religious consideration."

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.

B.
THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION DOES NOT HAVE THE
PRINCIPAL OR PRIMARY EFFECT OF ADVANCING OR
INHIBITING RELIGION.
The City Council policy expresses its "primary" purposes as
being those which are specified immediately above.

The balancing

of effects and intents stated and expressed by the City Council
in support of its opening ceremony policy must be given great
deference and presumed constitutional.

(See Point I.)

It is not enough under Lemon for the Separationists and the
ACLU to merely show that some of the prayers offered by the City
Council have some religious importance.

The test under Lemon is

whether these brief religious references have the "primary" or
"principal" effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.

In

considering this second prong of the Lemon test, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly acknowledged what the ACLU refuses to admit.
That is, that there is no "bright line" or simple analysis. See,
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678-9.
The Court has, instead, weighed the religious effects of a
51

The ACLU appears to argue for some constitutional "least
entangling alternative". (ACLU, p. 16-17.) As noted by Lynch
and Lemon, there is no "least entangling alternative"
requirement. Instead, the Court must and will look to the
legitimate expressed secular purpose and not impose its own
judgment as to any lesser alternatives on a co-equal branch of
government.
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governmental action against the other effects of the action and
against other religious interactions which have previously been
approved.
In this context the Supreme Court has recognized that:
[tjhere is an unbroken history of official
acknowledgment by all three branches of government of
the role of religion in American life from at least
1789.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674.

In Lynch, the United States Supreme

Court traced this "unbroken history" of governmental actions
which indisputably advance, support, endorse and approve religion
and none of which have been held unconstitutional.

These actions

include statements by the United States Supreme Court such as
that in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313, 96 L.Ed. 954
(1953):
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being.
(Emphasis added.)
Additionally, the Court in Lynch quoted President
Roosevelt's 1944 Proclamation of Thanksgiving referencing our
"Heavenly Father", our "Almighty God" and our "Holy Scriptures".
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675, fn. 3.

Lynch noted that such

proclamations are not limited to President Roosevelt, but have
also been issued by several other Presidents.

Additionally,

Congress has directed the President to proclaim a National Day of
Prayer each year "on which rdavl the people of the United States
may turn to God in prayer and meditation at churches, in groups,
and as individuals."

36 U.S.C. §169h (emphasis added).
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Presidents have also issued proclamations and messages to
commemorate, for example, Jewish Heritage Week and Jewish High
Holy Days.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677.

Of course, our statutorily prescribed national motto is "In
God We Trust", 36 U.S.C. §186, which was mandated to be included
on our currency.

31 U.S.C. §5112(d)(l).

The Supreme Court also

noted that the National Gallery in Washington:
[m]aintained with government support . . . has long
exhibited masterpieces with religious messages, notably
the Last Supper, and paintings depicting the Birth of
Christ, the Crucifixion and the Resurrection, among
many others with explicit Christian themes and
messages.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677.

(Footnote omitted.)

The Supreme Court also noted that every argument heard
before it is done under a painting which is a permanent symbol of
religion:

Moses with the Ten Commandments. _Ici. Of course, the

Federal courts hear all their cases and proceeding opened with an
announcement that concludes "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court."

Marsh, 463 U.S. 786.

Similarly, in Anderson

v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir. 1973), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit approved the
Ten Commandments monolith on the public property outside the
courtroom where this case was argued to the District Court.
If none of the activities cited above violated the Lemon
"primary effect" test it is impossible to argue seriously that
the City Council's occasional inclusion of brief ceremonial
prayers, moments of reflection, invocations or other opening
thoughts can have as their "primary effect" the unconstitutional
39

advancement or inhibition of religion.

THE CITY COUNCIL TRADITION DOES NOT CREATE AN
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT.
The most ambiguous of the three Lemon tests is the
"entanglement" test.

In beginning the analysis of

"entanglement", this Court should start at the same place that
the United States Supreme Court started its "entanglement"
analysis in Lemon:
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation
between church and state; total separation is not
possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship
between government and religious organizations is
inevitable.
* * *

Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize
that the wall of separation, far from being a "wall,"
is a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added).
Lemon went on to hold that entanglement must be examined on
three standards:
1. The character and purposes of the institutions that
are benefitted;
2.

The nature of the aid that the State provides; and

3. The resulting relationship between the government
and the religious authority.
Id. at 615. Taking those three subtests individually, it is
52

Ironically, the Separationists and the ACLU's use of the
public property and funds of this Court in advancing this lawsuit
to silence the expression of religious diversity clearly does
have as its "primary effect" the inhibition, or at least the
attempted inhibition, of religion.
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clear that the City Council tradition does not create an
excessive "entanglement".
First, no single religious institution is "benefitted" by
the City Council practice of allowing occasional prayers, on an
ecumenical basis, as part of an opening ceremony.

To find

entanglement, this Court would be required to find that the
occasional practice of prayer more directly benefits the
institutions of religion than:
[ejxpenditure of large sums of public money for
textbooks supplied throughout the country to students
attending church sponsored schools . . . , expenditure
of public funds for transportation of students to
church-sponsored schools . . . , federal grants for
college buildings of church-sponsored institutions of
higher education combining secular and religious
education . . . noncategorical grants to churchsponsored colleges and universities . . • , and [ ]
tax exemptions for church properties . . . .
It would
also require that we view it as more of an endorsement
of religion than the Sunday Closing Laws . . . , the
release time program for religious training, and the
legislative prayers [all of which have been upheld]
Id. at 681-2.

(Citations omitted.)

The benefit to religion in

this case would also need to be greater than the Supreme Court's
approval of a Christmas creche in Lynch.
The same analysis and comparisons apply to the second
subportion of the entanglement test - investigating the "nature
of the aid that the State provides . . . ."
615.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at

Again relying on Lynch, the City Council tradition is not

improperly aiding a religion.
fWlhatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all
religions, is indirect, remote, and incidental: display
of the Creche is no more an advancement or endorsement
of religion than the Congressional and Executive
41

recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as
"Christs Mass" or the exhibition of literally hundreds
of religious paintings in governmentally supported
museums.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.

(Emphasis added.)

Concerning the third subtest of the "entanglement"
analysis - the resulting relationship between government and
religion - the ACLU has completely misunderstood what the Supreme
Court was aiming to prevent.

The ACLU went into exhaustive

detail below as to the efforts necessary by the City to
coordinate the offering of prayer (viz. preparing agendas,
distributing guidelines, etc.).

(R. 587-8.)

The ACLU claimed

that this established some "entangling" involvement of the State
in monitoring or overseeing religious affairs.
In fact, it does nothing of the kind.

The City Council is

not injecting itself in any way into the affairs of a religion.
Instead, the City Council is merely monitoring its own affairs.
There is no "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
surveillance" of a religion by the City Council required by
allowing occasional prayers.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.

Thus, the City Council tradition meets all of the three
subtests of "entanglement".

No religious institutions are

improperly "benefitted" by the City Council practice.
improper aid is provided to any religion.

No

Finally, there is no

"surveillance" or "monitoring" of a religion by the City Council.
The ACLU is, therefore, left with relying on yet another
variation of the "entanglement" test - "divisiveness".
18-20.)

(ACLU, p.

The ACLU appears to claim that simply because suits have
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recently been brought against school prayer and, City Council
prayers and legislative committees are studying potential
constitutional amendments, therefore, they argue that the
practice of prayer is so divisive as to automatically be
"entanglement".

Unfortunately for the ACLU, the United States

Supreme Court has held directly to the contrary.
A litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a
lawsuit, however, create the appearance of divisiveness
and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-5.
In ruling that the creche in Lynch was not so "divisive" as
to mandate a finding of "entanglement", the Supreme Court relied
on a forty year "calm history" "marked by no apparent
dissention".

JA. at 684, quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 525 F.Supp.

1150, 1179 (D.R.I. 1981).

In the instant case, the City

Council's tradition of prayer began with its direct ancestor, the
City Council of Great Salt Lake City, in 1851. With the
exception of a few objections by the individual plaintiffs in
1981, and now this lawsuit, there is nothing to disturb the "calm
history" of the City Council tradition.

Further, the City

Council tradition is mirrored in the "calm history" of the Utah
Legislature, the Utah Constitutional Convention and, before both
of these, the Territorial Legislature dating to 1847.
"Divisiveness" in this case appears to be mostly in the minds of
the Separationists and the ACLU.
be sanctioned by this Court.
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Such "bootstrapping" should not

CONCLUSION
This case requires this Court to address serious
constitutional issues of the highest magnitude.

As demonstrated

by the Council Members' original Brief and this Reply Brief, the
lower court's Order must be reversed for numerous significant
constitutional violations.
First, the lower court's Order fails to give the required
deference and presumption of constitutionality to the acts of a
co-equal branch of government, the legislative body of the Salt
Lake City Council.
Secondly, the lower court's Order (apparently now conceded
by the Separationists) improperly violated the elected City
legislators' individual legislative absolute immunity from suit
and their Speech and Debate Privilege.
Third, the lower court improperly adopted a rule of
legislative construction (the "plain meaning rule"), as fully
applicable to the far different task of construing the provisions
of a Constitution.

This Court has long recognized that

constitutional analysis requires a far more sophisticated
evaluation to determine the original intent and purpose of a
constitutional provision, as drafted by the Framers of the
provision and adopted by the electorate•
Finally, because of the other errors mentioned above, this
Court must investigate the relationship of not just City Council
prayer, but also the entire panoply of religious invocation and
symbolism under the provisions of Article I, Section 4 of the
44

Utah Constitution,

Article I, Section 4 must be analyzed in

light of its historical intent and purpose, as demonstrated by
the long history of prayer in the United States; Utah, beginning
with the Territorial Legislature; Great Salt Lake City,
continuing through the Constitutional Convention; the State
Legislature; and, Salt Lake City.

It is clear from this study,

that the intent and purpose of the framers of Article I, Section
4 could not possibly have included the prohibition of legislative
ceremonial prayer.
The Order of the lower court must be reversed.

This Court

should specifically reaffirm the constitutional presumptions to
which municipal legislative acts are entitled.

It should affirm

that the legislative members of the Salt Lake City Council are
entitled to absolute legislative immunity and their Speech and
Debate Privileges.

It should affirm that constitutional analysis

requires a sophisticated consideration of intent and purpose.
Finally, this Court should affirm that Article I, Section 4
does not manifest an unbending hostility towards religion which,
prohibits an important long standing tradition and practice of
the Salt Lake City Council, the Utah State Legislature and
numerous other cities, towns and counties throughout Utah.
Respectfully submitted this *Q

day of November, 1992.

City Attorney
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JOHN PACE
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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84111-3204
Phone: (801) 328-9531 or 328-9532

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY

SOCIETY OF
SEPARATIONISTS, INC.,
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS;
and J. WALKER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF UTAH

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
OBJECTION & MOTION
FOR CLARIFICATION
Civil NO. 91-090-6136 CV

RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
City Council
Defendants.

(Hon. J.D. FREDERICK)

PLAINTIFFS, by and through their counsel, BRIAN M.
BARNARD, respond to defendants' memorandum (hereinafter
"Objection Memo"), OBJECTION to proposed order and MOTION FOR
CLARIFICATION all dated March 11, 1992 as follows:

RESPONSE TO OBJECTION
Defendants' Feigned Ignorance
Defendants feign ignorance as to what is a "prayer."
Objection Memo, pp. 1 - 5 .

Defendants have some idea as to

what constitutes a "prayer" in that they recited in their
pleadings and post-suit guidelines dealing with thoughts/
readings/invocations that there has been a one hundred and
forty (140+) years tradition of prayer at City Council
meetings.

Page 1, October 17, 1991, Guidelines regarding

"Thoughts/Readings/ Invocations" to be used as part of
opening ceremonies for City Council meetings (copy attached
to this memorandum as Exhibit "0").
Defendants express (Objection Memo, p. 2) concern that
this Court has adopted the Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary, 1979, p. 896, definition of prayer:

"an address

as a petition to God or a god in word or thought;" "the act
or practice of praying to God or a god" as cited by
plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memorandum, p. 15.

That definition of prayer is commonly used and accepted; if
the court sees fit to include a definition in its order, such
a definition would not be inappropriate.

2

Post-Suit Guidelines
After this lawsuit was filed, but before the summary
judgment was granted, defendants on October 17, 1991, adopted
certain guidelines regarding "Thoughts/Readings/Invocations"
to be used as part of opening ceremonies for City Council
meetings.

Exhibit fl0,f attached.

Defendants now request

(Objection Memo, pp. 7-8) that this court examine each
element of those guidelines and determine which elements are
prohibited as "prayers."

Because those guidelines were

adopted after this suit was filed as a defense strategy1, the
Court should not consider the contents of those guidelines.
Plaintiffs' complaint made no claim against said guidelines.
Plaintiffs have never suggested that thoughts or
readings, in and of themselves, are prohibited by Art. I, §
4; and, no such claim or allegation is before the Court.2
Said guidelines also encourage and allow "invocations."
Exhibit "0".

By definition "invocations" are religious in

1

The guidelines acknowledge that "thoughts" and
"readings" are something new added to the opening ceremony
plan in 1991. Policy, p. 2, 5 I (B) (6), Exhibit "0"
attached. Previously only prayers or invocations had been
part of the opening ceremonies.
2

Needless to say, if a thought or reading presented
as part of the Council's agenda constitutes "religious
worship, exercise or instruction" then it is prohibited by
Art. I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
3

nature.

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, 1979, p. 602,

defines invocation as:

"the act or process of petitioning

for help or support;" "an invocatory prayer as at the
beginning of a service or worship."

Defendants acknowledge

that the invocations to be offered before the Court will
involve religion.

Exhibit "0", especially last page. In

addition to using the word "prayer" in the proposed order,
the Court might specifically prohibit "invocations" as
referred to by defendants in Exhibit "0."
Common usage as to what is a "prayer" would suffice for
defendants to know what the Court prohibits.

For added

guidance, defendants might read the language of Art. I, § 4,
Utah Constitution, prohibiting govenment sponsored "religious
worship, exercise or instruction" and note that what occurred
on September 10, 1991 as recited in plaintiffs' complaint
clearly falls within that prohibition.

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION
Defendants' motion for clarification amounts to a
request for an advisory opinion by this Court.

Defendants

ask this court to determine whether certain proposed
hypothetical conduct violates Art. I, § 4 of the Utah
4

Constitution, when the conduct is not before the Court and
when the conduct has not been challenged by plaintiffs.
There is no case or controversy before this Court as to
defendants singing patriotic songs, mentioning the word God,
reading from dollar bills or historical documents,
administering oaths "so help you God,"3 a private citizen
reciting the Lord's prayer during a Council meeting but not
as part of the agenda, etc.

Defendants offer no evidence

that these incidents have occurred or will occur in the
future and plaintiffs have not asked this Court to speculate
that such things might occur.
Plaintiffs have not suggested in this action that any
of the foregoing hypothetical acts violate Art. I, § 4 of the
3

Defendants make mention of Ut. Code Ann. §§ 78-24-17
& 18 & 19 (1953 as amended) which proscribe forms of oaths
for witnesses to include the phrase "so help you God."
Defendants failed to note that those statutes provide
for an alternative: "You do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
the evidence you shall give . . . shall be the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God (or,
under the pains and penalties of perjury.)11 Emphasis added.
Id.
The alternative offered in those statutes is worthy of
note; it is non-religious in nature, however it accomplishes
the same goals — the witness has noted the solemnity of the
occasion, entered into an obligation and can be punished for
failing to tell the truth.
Thus, the Salt Lake City Council need not be concerned
(Objection Memo, p. 5) about whether the use of such an oath
violates the Utah Constitution because the Council can
easily secure truthful evidence without invoking the name of
a deity.
5

Utah Constitution.

Plaintiffs do not suggest herein that the

mere mention of the word "God11 violates the Utah Constitution.4 A reading of the complaint herein shows that
plaintiffs complained of what is clearly "religious worship,
exercise or instruction," the formal recitation of prayers as
part of the agenda of City Council meetings.

That is all

that was and is before this Court in this action.
The Court should decline defendants' invitation to
speculate as to the legality of matters not before the
Court.5

DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
For the first time in this case, in their motion for
clarification and objection, defendants express concerns for

4

Defendants may next suggest that Judge Frederick
violated Art. I, § 4, Ut. Const, because he repeated in his
written opinion the clearly denominational prayer recited at
the City Council meeting of September 10, 1991. Memorandum
Decision, March 2, 1991, p. 5, 5 12.
Obviously, the repetition of that prayer by Judge
Frederick was not done as "religious worship, exercise or
instruction," and thus, does not violate the Utah
Constitution.
5

If such conduct does offend the Utah Constitution
such to warrant a lawsuit, defendants will be served a
summons and a complaint and the matter will be formally
presented to a Court.
6

the rights of individual City Council members to pray and to
utter profanities.6 Objection Memo, p. 5.
Defendants contend that the proposed order and ruling
chill and inhibit the individual defendant's right to free
speech and free exercise of their religion.

Plaintiffs did

not seek to and this Court cannot inhibit the defendants'
individual rights to practice free speech or exercise their
religion, outside of the governmental context, as protected
by the Utah and federal constitutions.
Contrary to defendants' suggestion, government
sponsored prayers do not fall under the protection of "free
speech" or the "free exercise of religion."

Yes, defendants

gave up certain rights when they become government officials.
If defendants can convince a court that future
individual prayers uttered during City Council meetings are
"private" in nature and not sponsored, allowed or encouraged
by government officials, such prayers may be not subject to

Defendants' concern about of the Speech and Debate
clause of the Utah Constitution is mis-placed. That
provision, Art. VI, § 8, applies only to state legislators
and not to city council members. There is no similar
protection for city officials.
7

the injunction herein.

But such nice fine line-drawing is

dangerous and offers great potential for abuse.7
The order does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Utah or federal Constitution as applied to the
individual defendants.

All Utah government officials are

being treated fairly; the law applies equally, none of them
are allowed to violate provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Defendants gave up certain rights when they become
government officials.

Acting as government authorities, they

must act within the bounds of the Utah Constitution.

In

fact, upon taking office each defendant took an oath to
"support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of this State."8
7

In the area of potential abuse, defendants' good
faith has to be questioned when they recite, " . . . the only
activity clearly prohibited by the Memorandum Decision would
be a repetition of the September 10, 1991 offering made by
the Salt Lake Police Chaplin." Objection Memo, p. 2.
8

Oath of office. "All officers made elective or
appointive by this Constitution or by the laws made in
pursuance thereof, before entering upon the duties of their
respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following
oath or affirmation: 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of this State, and that I
will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity.'"
Emphasis added. Ut.Const. Art. IV, § 10, 1896; Ut. Code
Ann. § 52-1-4 (1953 as amended).
Two (2) items within this constitutional provision are
worthy of note. The provision allows an affirmation in lieu
of an oath, and government officials take a solemn oath to
8

CONCLUSION
The proposed order is sufficiently clear that a person
of ordinary intelligence can understand it. Notwithstanding
defendants' cavilling, based upon common usage, a reasonable
person would know what is prohibited by the ruling and
proposed order.

To determine what is a prayer defendants can

refer to the long-standing City Council tradition referred to
in their policy of October 17, 1991. Exhibit "0" attached.
The order is not vague. The order provides sufficient
guidance to defendants, especially when read along with Art.
I, § 4, Ut. Const., that they can govern their conduct and
act within constitutional bounds. The order is narrowly
drawn especially when it contains a reference to and a
determination that prior prayers at City Council meetings
violated the Utah Constitution.
Defendants' suggestion that their own personal rights
to equal protection of the laws, to free speech and to
exercise their religion should over-ride the Utah
Constitution are without merit.
Neither the March 2, 1992 ruling of this Court nor the
order as prepared by plaintiffs' counsel are in need of

discharge their duties without reference to a deity.
9

clarification.

Defendants' objection and motion to clarify

should be denied.
DATED this 18th day of MARCH, 1992.

M. B^
Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
OBJECTION AND MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION to:
ROGER CUTLER & BRUCE BAIRD
Attorneys for Defendants
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEYS
SALT LAKE CITY & COUNTY BUILDING
WASHINGTON SQUARE
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
KATHRYN KENDELL
STAFF COUNSEL
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS, A C L U
BOSTON BUILDING
#419
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
on the 18th day of MARCH, 1992, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

bmb\slcclamo rej\sos
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R 91-1
G 91-35

RESOLUTION FORMALIZING THE COUNCIL'S
PUBLIC MEETING OPENING CEREMONY PROCESS
No. 97 of 1991
WHEREAS, Salt Lake City was originally incorporated by
legislation adopted by the Territorial Legislature on January 9,
1951, and under that organization, the City commenced a tradition
(with its first Council meeting on January 11, 1851) by having an
opening ceremony which included a prayer; and
WHEREAS, this tradition continued following the adoption of
the State Constitution in 1896, with an interlude during the time
the City adopted the Commission form of government, which form
combined the administrative and legislative powers of the
government and which conducted City governance in frequent
daytime meetings; and
WHEREAS, the opening ceremony tradition was renewed in
January 1980, when the legislative and executive powers were
separated because the City voted to operate under the
Council/Mayor optional form of government, holding evening
meetings to conduct the legislative functions of government at a
time most convenient to citizen attendance; and
WHEREAS, on or about September 23, 1987 the Council was
sensitized to recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S.
District Court opinions concerning invocations at publicly
attended legislative sessions of government; and
WHEREAS, the Council renewed and reemphasized its policy of
including all segments of the community in pronouncing
invocations as part of its opening ceremonies, which also
included a Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States;

and
WHEREAS, the Council has become aware of some concerns
expressed about the Council's opening ceremonies and it desires
to memorialize and confirm, in writing, its tradition and
policies regarding opening ceremonies for legislative sessions
and other public meetings conducted by the Council;
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved that Salt Lake City does
hereby formally adopt the annexed policy concerning opening
ceremonies at legislative and other public gatherings, conducted
under the auspices of Salt Lake City's legislative body.

Said

policy shall remain in effect until otherwise repealed or
modified by a majority vote of the Council.
Passed by the City Council of Salt Lake City, Utah, this
17th

day of

,

October

19jy.

SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL

By

Z

CHAIRPERSON
ATTEST:

2

SUGGESTIONS FOR THOSE WHO PRESENT
THOUGHTS/READINGS/INVOCATIONS IN
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL MEETINGS
Thank you for taking the time to volunteer to continue our
tradition of presenting a thought/reading/invocation at a City
Council meeting. We have found from long experience that a
thought/reading/invocation as a part of the opening ceremony at
the beginning of Council meetings creates a thoughtful atmosphere
in which to perform our services to the community. This practice
promotes civility, sensitivity and cultural diversity.
We recognize that we live in a community where there are
many and diverse points of view on religion and other matters of
philosophy. Therefore, to eliminate or reduce offense, if your
belief or philosophy allows you to do so, we ask that your
thought/reading/invocation comply with the following:
1. References which may recognize or be unique to a
particular religious belief should be avoided.
2. The thought/reading/invocation should not include an
attempt to convert or advance any particular faith, belief or
philosophy or disparage any other faith, belief or philosophy.
3. All such presentations will be made gratuitously and as
a part of the Opening Ceremony of each of the City Council's
regular Tuesday meetings, which will also includes a Pledge of
Allegiance to the Flag.
The City will not regulate or dictate the form or substance
of a presentation. Rather, these guidelines are to remind you of
the cultural diversity of the community and request that all
statements be sensitive to the feelings of others and promote
understanding, elevate motives and create a more civil
environment for conducting the public's business.
SALT LAKE CITY COUNCIL*

*Per Council Resolution of 10/17/91.

ATTACHMENT "2"

Alaska
Alaska Statutes (1980)
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
Alaska Const., Art. I, §4
Arizona
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1984)
No public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or
instruction, or to the support of any religious
worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of
any religious establishment.
Ariz. Const., Art. 2, §12
California
Cal. Code (Deering)(1981)
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and
county, township, school district, or other municipal
corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay
from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or
in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or
sectarian purpose, ...
Cal. Const., art. XVI, §5
Colorado
Colo. Rev. Stat. (1973)
No person shall be required to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship, religious sect or
denomination against his consent. Nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious
denomination or mode of worship.
Colo. Const, art. II, §4
Idaho
Idaho Code (1980)
The exercise and enjoyment of religious faith and
worship shall forever be guaranteed; ... No person
shall be required to attend or support any ministry or
place of worship, religious sect or denomination, or
pay tithes against his consent; nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious
denomination or mode of worship. Bigamy and polygamy
are forever prohibited in the state .•.
Idaho Const, art. I, §4
Montana
Mont. Code Ann. (1991)
The state shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
Mont. Const, art. II, §5
Nevada
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1986)
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship without discrimination or preference shall
forever be allowed in this State ...
Nev. Const, art. 1 §4
New Mexico
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1978)
No person shall be required to attend any place of

worship or support any religious sect or denomination;
nor shall any preference be given by law to any
religious denomination or mode of worship.
N.M. Const, art. II §11
Oregon
Or. Rev. Stat (1991)
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the
benefit of any religious (sic), or theological
institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for
the payment of any religious (sic) services in either
house of the Legislative Assembly.
Or. Const, art. I, §5
Utah

Utah. Code Ann.(1991)
No public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment.
Utah Const, art I, §4

Washington
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. (1988)
No public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment: ...
Wash. Const, art. 1, §11
Wyoming
Wyo Stat. Ann. (197 7)
No money of the state shall ever be given or
appropriated to any sectarian or religious society or
institution.
Wyo. Const, art. 1, §19

Alabama
Ala. Code (1975)
That no religion shall be established by law; .. not to
pay any tithes, taxes, or other rate for building or
repairing any place of worship, or for maintaining any
minister or ministry; ...
Alabama Const., Art. I, §3
Alaska
Alaska Statutes (1980)
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,
Alaska Const., Art. I, §4
Arizona
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1984)
No public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise, or
instruction, or to the support of any religious
worship, exercise, or instruction, or to the support of
any religious establishment.
Ariz. Const., Art. 2, §12
Arkansas
Ark. Stat. Ann. (19 87)
No human authority can, in any case or manner
whatsoever, control or interfere with the right of
conscience; and no preference shall ever by given, by
law, to any religious establishment, denomination or
mode of worship above any other.
Ark. Const., art. 2, §24
California
Cal. Code (Deering)(1981)
Neither the Legislature, nor any county, city and
county, township, school district, or other municipal
corporation, shall ever make an appropriation, or pay
from any public fund whatever, or grant anything to or
in aid of any religious sect, church, creed, or
sectarian purpose, ...
Cal. Const., art. XVI, §5
Colorado
Colo. Rev. Stat. (1973)
No person shall be required to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship, religious sect or
denomination against his consent. Nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious
denomination or mode of worship.
Colo. Const, art. II, §4
Connecticut
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1991)
The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination, shall forever be free
to all persons in the state; ...
Conn. Const., art. I, §3
Delaware
Del. Code. Ann (1974)
Although it is the duty of all men frequently to
assemble together for the public worship ... yet no man

shall or ought to be compelled to attend any religious
worship, to contribute to the erection or support of
any place or worship, or to the maintenance of any
ministry, ...
Del. Const, art. I, §1
District of Columbia
D.C. Code Ann. (1991)
The State shall establish no religion nor interfere
with the free exercise thereof. No person shall be
denied any right or privilege because of religious
belief or the exercise thereof.
D.C. Const, art. I, §2
Florida
Fla. Stat. (1992)
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of
religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise
thereof. ... No revenue of the state or any political
subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from
the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of
any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid
of any sectarian institution.
Fla. Const, art. 1, §3
Georgia
Ga. Code Ann. (1983)
Each person has the natural and inalienable right to
worship God, each according to the dictates of that
person's own conscience; and no human authority should,
in any case, control or interfere with such right of
conscience.
Ga. Const, art. I, §1, paragraph 3
Hawaii
Haw. Rev. Stat. (1988)
No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances.
Haw. Const, art. I, §4
Idaho
Idaho Code (1980)
The exercise and enjoyment of religious faith and
worship shall forever be guaranteed; ... No person
shall be required to attend or support any ministry or
place of worship, religious sect or denomination, or
pay tithes against his consent; nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious
denomination or mode of worship. Bigamy and polygamy
are forever prohibited in the state ...
Idaho Const, art. I, §4
Illinois
111. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1971)
No person shall be required to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious

denomination or mode of worship.
111. Const- art. 1, §3
Indiana
Ind. Code Ann. (Burns 1990)
No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the
benefit of any religious or theological institution.
Ind. Const, art. 1, §6
Iowa

Iowa Code Ann. (1989)
The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; nor shall any person be compelled to
attend any place of worship, pay tithes, taxes, or
other rates for building or repairing places of
worship, or the maintenance of any minister, or
ministry.
Iowa Const, art. 1, §3

Kansas
Kan. Stat. Ann. (1988)
The right to worship God according to the dictates of
conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any
person be compelled to attend or support any form of
worship; ... nor any preference be given by law to any
religious establishment or mode of worship.
Kan. Const. Bill of Rights §7
Kentucky
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1988)
No preference shall ever by given by law to any
religious sect, society or denomination; nor to any
particular creed, mode of worship or system of
ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be
compelled to attend any place of worship, to contribute
the erection or maintenance of any such place, or to
salary or support of any minister of religion; ...
Ky Const. Bill of Rights §5
Louisiana
La. Constitution
No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
La. Const, art. 1, §8
Maine

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1991 Supp.)
... and no subordination nor preference of any one sect
or denomination to another shall ever be established by
law, ...
Me. Const, art. 1, §3

Maryland
Md. Ann. Code (1981)
That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in
such manner as he thinks most acceptable to Him, ...
wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in
his person or estate, on account of his religious
persuasion, or profession, or for his religious
practice ... nor ought any person to be compelled to

frequent, or maintain, or contribute, unless on
contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any
ministry; ... Nothing shall prohibit or require the
making reference to belief in, reliance upon, or
invoking the aid of God or a Supreme Being in any
governmental or public document, proceeding, activity,
ceremony, school, institution, or place. Nothing in
this article shall constitute an establishment of
religion.
Md. Const. Declaration of Rights art. 36
Massachusetts
Mass. Ann. Laws (1979)
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in
society, publicly, and at stated seasons to worship the
Supreme Being, the great Creator and Preserver of the
universe.
Constitution of Massachusetts Pt. 1, Art. 2 §3
... and no subordination of any one sect or
denomination to another shall ever be established by
law.
Mass. Const, pt. 1, art. 3 §4
Michigan
Mich. Stat. Ann (1983)
No person shall be compelled to attend, or, against his
consent, to contribute to the erection or support of
any place of religious worship, or to pay tithes, taxes
or other rates for the support of any minister of the
gospel or teacher of religion. No money shall be
appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit
of any religious sect or society, theological or
religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the
state be appropriated for any such purpose.
Mich. Const, art. I §4
Minnesota
Minn. Stat. Ann. (1976)
... nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship, or to maintain any
religious or ecclesiastical ministry, against his
consent; ... or any preference be given by law to any
religious establishment or mode of worship ... nor
shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of any religious societies or religious or
theological seminaries.
Minn. Restructured Const, art. 1, §16
Mississippi
Miss. Code Ann. (1972)
... no preference shall be given by law to any
religious sect or mode of worship; ...
Miss. Const, art. 3, §18
Missouri
Mo. Ann. Stat. (Vernon 1970)
That no person can be compelled to erect, support or
attend any place or system or whorship, or to maintain

or support any priest, minister, preacher or teacher of
any sect, church, creed or denomination of religion;
Mo. Const, art. 1 §6
That no money shall ever be taken from the public
treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church,
sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any
priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such;
and that no preference shall be given to nor any
discimination made against any church, sect or creed of
religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.
Mo. Const, art. 1, §7
Montana
Mont. Code Ann. (1991)
The state shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
Mont. Const, art. II, §5
Nebraska
Neb. Rev. Stat. (1989)
No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship against his consent, and
no preference shall be given by law to any religious
society, ...
Neb. Const, art. 1, §4
Nevada
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1986)
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship without discrimination or preference shall
forever be allowed in this State ...
Nev. Const, art. 1 §4
New Hampshire
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1988)
But no person shall ever be compelled to pay towards
the support of the schools of any sect or denomination.
N.H. Const, pt. 1, art. 6
New Jersey
N.J. Stat. Ann. (1971)
...nor shall any person be obliged to pay tithes,
taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any
church or churches, place or places of worship, or for
the maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary
to what he believes to be right or has deliberately and
voluntarily engaged to perform.
N.J. Const, art. 1, paragraph 3
New Mexico
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1978)
No person shall be required to attend any place of
worship or support any religious sect or denomination;
nor shall any preference be given by law to any
religious denomination or mode of worship.
N.M. Const, art. II §11

New York
N.Y. Laws (McKinney 19 82)
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed in this state to all mankind;
N.Y. Const, art. 1 §3
North Carolina
N.C. Gen. Stat. (1984)
All persons have a natural and inalienable right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their
own consciences, and no human authority shall, in any
case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience.
N.C. Const, art. I, §13
North Dakota
N.D. Cent. Code (1981)
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference shall
be forever guaranteed in this state, and no person
shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness or juror
on account of his opinion on matters of religious
belief; ...
N.D. Const, art. I, §3
Ohio

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (19 79)
No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or
support any place of worship, or maintain any form of
worship, against his consent; and no preference shall
be given, by law, to any religious society; nor shall
any interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted.
Ohio Const, art. I, §7

Oklahoma
Okla. Stat. Ann. (199)
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister,
or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian
institution as such.
Okla. Const, art. 2, §5
Oregon
Or. Rev. Stat (1991)
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury for the
benefit of any religious (sic), or theological
institution, nor shall any money be appropriated for
the payment of any religious (sic) services in either
house of the Legislative Assembly; Or. Const, art. I, §5
Pennsylvania
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon 1969)
•.. no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect
or support any place of worship, or to maintain any

ministry against his consent; ... and no preference
shall ever be given by law to any religious
establishments or modes of worship.
Pa. Const, art. 1, §3
Rhode Island
R.I. Gen. Laws (1987)
... no person shall be compelled to frequent or to
support any religious worship, place, or ministry
whatever, except in fulfillment of such person's
voluntary contract; ...
R.I. Const, art. 1, §3
South Carolina
S.C. Code Ann. (1976)
The General Assembly shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, ...
S.C. Const, art. I, §2
South Dakota
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. (1978)
No person shall be compelled to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship against his consent nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious
establishment or mode of worship. No money or property
of the state shall be given or appropriated for the
benefit of any sectarian or religious society or
institution.
S.D. Const, art. VI, §3
Tennessee

Tenn. Code Ann. (1980)

... that no man can of right be compelled to attend,
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain
any minister against his consent; ... and that no
preference shall ever be given, by law, to any
religious establishment or mode of worship.
Tenn. Const, art. 1, §3
Texas
Tex. Code Ann. (Vernon 1984)
No money shall be appropriated, or drawn from the
Treasury for the benefit of any sect, or religious
society, theological or religious seminary nor shall
property belonging to the State be appropriated for any
such purposes.
Tex. Const, art. I, §7
Utah

Utah. Code Ann.(1991)
No public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment.
Utah Const, art I, §4

Vermont
Vt. Stat. Ann. (1985)
... and that no man ought to, or of right can be

compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or
support any place of worship, or maintain any minister,
Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 3
Virginia
Va. Code Ann. (1987)
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor
shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened
in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on
account of his religious opinions or belief; ... And
the General Assembly shall not prescribe any religious
test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or
advantages on any sect or denomination, or pass any law
requiring or authorizing any religious society, or the
people within any district within this Commonwealth, to
levy on themselves or others, any tax for the erection
or repair of any house of public worship, or for the
support of any church or ministry, ...
Va. Const, art. I, §16
Washington
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. (1988)
No public money or property shall be appropriated for
or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious
establishment: ...
Wash. Const, art. 1, §11
West Virginia
W. Va. Code (1982)
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever; nor
shall any man be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened, in his body or goods, or otherwise suffer on
account of his religious opinions of belief, ... or
pass any law requiring or authorizing any religious
society, or the people of any district within this
State, to levy on themselves, or others, any tax for
the erection or repair of any house for public worship,
or for the support of any church or ministry, ...
W. Va. Const, art. 3, §15
Wisconsin
Wis. Stat. Ann. (1986)
... nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect
or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or
interference with, the rights of conscience be
permitted, or any preference be given by law to any
religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall
any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of
religious societies, or religious or theological
seminaries.
Wis. Const, art. 1, §18

Wyoming
Wyo Stat. Ann. (1977)
No money of the state shall ever be given or
appropriated to any sectarian or religious society or
institution.
Wyo. Const, art. 1, §19

